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ABSTRACT
The current study looked at the Common Ingroup Identity Model and its link to need for
closure, a cognitive construct that causes individuals to seek out quick and finite answers.
Based on previous research, I predicted that participants high in situational and
dispositional need for closure would be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity
Model than participants who were not. Results indicated that need for closure does not
have a direct relationship with the model; however, a three-way interaction suggests that
a more complex relationship may exist. These results give the Common Ingroup Identity
Model more applicability within real-world situations. The findings also add to previous
research on need for closure‟s relationship with prejudice reduction and suggest that its
impact may be limited to techniques focused on intergroup contact.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Just then I noticed that almost all the people… were greeting each other, exchanging
remarks and forming groups – behaving, in fact, as in a club where the company of
others of one’s own tastes and standing makes one feel at ease.” – Albert Camus,
L’Etranger
One of the main focuses of social psychology over its history is the study of
prejudice. While prejudice research has focused primarily on identifying the different
types of prejudices, as well as how and why prejudices form, a more applied area of
prejudice research has developed which looks at ways to reduce prejudice. These
prejudice reduction techniques look to combat, reduce, or change prejudice attitudes
through psychological means. One of these techniques is the Common Ingroup Identity
Model. Because of its focus on the role of categorization in the prejudice development,
cognitive processes have been linked to this model‟s effectiveness. One cognitive process
that has not been previously linked to the model is need for closure. The purpose of the
current study is to look at the moderating effects of need for closure on the effectiveness
of the Common Ingroup Identity Model.
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Prejudice, History, and Psychology
The term prejudice refers to any preconceived, subjective judgment of a person or
thing which, whether positive or negative, is not based on actual experiences (Allport,
1954). Although prejudices are formed prior to experience, they can persist after
exposure to the prejudice group through different cognitive processes, such as skewed
perception (Binning & Sherman, 2011) or memory bias (Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter,
2007). Many different types of prejudices have been identified, including racism, sexism,
ageism (Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982), classism, sexual prejudice, religious intolerance
(Aosved, Long, & Voller, 2009), speciesism (Marcu, Lyons, & Hegarty, 2007),
weightism (Blaine & McElroy, 2002), and ableism (Smith, Foley, & Chaney, 2008).
Essentially, any possible categorical parsing of a social setting, which allows for one
group to be compared to another group, can lead to prejudice.
Throughout history, these prejudices have played a major role in many significant
events. Early examples of religious intolerance can be found in the Biblical persecution
of the Jewish peoples by the Egyptians and Romans, the persecution of early Christians
by the Romans (and the subsequent persecution of pagans by the then-christened Roman
Empire), and the Christian Crusades. Racism was at the heart of the colonial strategies of
many different empires, with racial superiority being one of the main arguments used to
justify the maltreatment of indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, and Australasia.
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Sexism, while less historically evident, can be seen covertly through laws regarding
women across different civilizations as well as the 19th century trend of female writers
(such as the Bronte sisters) to take pen names in order to have their works published. A
more overt example of historical sexism can be found in the Salem witch trials of the late
17th century.
A historical look at psychology shows that prejudice, and more specifically
sexism and racism, has been a popular topic of research (see Richards, 2010 for a
review). Interestingly, it was the search for race and sex differences in psychology that
eventually led researchers to the concepts of prejudice. In Psychology‟s infancy,
differences between races and genders were assumed to be innate or based on the natural
evolution of humanity. Therefore, early psychological research was focused on seeking
out and identifying which areas different races performed differently on (or, more
specifically, which areas white men performed better than other groups on). This is
historically referred to as scientific racism. Some exemplars from the field of psychology
who were heavily involved in early race difference research include Francis Galton and
Gustav Le Bon. Sex differences in psychology follow the same general trend, with
psychological differences applied to such physiological phenomenon as brain size,
menstruation, and the inherent “need” of child-bearing (for example, Romanes, 1887; and
Spencer, 1861).
Out of the search for group differences emerged the study of prejudice (Richards,
2010). The two driving forces behind this shift were cultural pressure and a lack of
evidence of actual group differences. An emerging African-American and feminine voice
in American and European society was strongly opposed to the assertion of white male
3

superiority by group difference researchers. At the same time, researchers were actually
finding no group differences in such studies as the 1898 Cambridge Exposition (Costall,
1999) and Woodworth‟s 1910 examination of racial differences. These two factors led
psychologists in the early 1930s to the beginnings of prejudice research: if group
differences do not actually exist, then something else must be driving the perception that
they do.
Covert Racism and Other Prejudices
Racism is a prejudice of one group of people by another based on the color of
their skin. Racism is one of the most salient social categories that people use to group
others, and has been the focus of extensive research in psychology, particularly in
America (Richards, 2010). This is likely because, in the relatively short history of the
United States, racism has been at the heart of several important events, such as the Trail
of Tears, slavery, the Civil War, the Civil Rights movement, and (tangentially) the
Holocaust. Whatever the reason, racism has remained a popular topic in psychology: an
April 2012 search for the terms “race”, “racism”, or “racist” on PsycINFO yielded over
47,000 resulting publications.
One result of this research has been the identification of different forms that
racism can be expressed through. Old-fashioned or traditional racism refers to blatant,
directly racist attitudes and behaviors that characterize the stereotypically racist
individual (Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000). All of the historical examples given above
are typical of old-fashioned racism. Over time, old-fashioned racism has largely
disappeared from public attitudes (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000), but, in its
place, new, covert forms of racism have been found.
4

Symbolic racism (and the related concept, modern racism) refers to those racist
attitudes and behaviors that are exhibited towards members of another race through
indirect or symbolic manners (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1983). Symbolic
racists typically exhibit their racist beliefs when an alternative, socially acceptable
explanation of their behavior is available. Similarly, modern racists exhibit racist
behaviors when there is ideological and situational ambiguity and race is not the focal
point of the situation. Some examples of symbolic and modern racism include opposition
to affirmative action and gay marriage, and the tendency for employers to favor
applicants of the same race.
Another covert form of racism is aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005).
Aversive racism refers to those forms of racism that are not driven by a hatred of people
of a different race but instead are motivated by a discomfort or aversion with individuals
from other races. Aversive racists typically express their beliefs unintentionally and
honestly believe that they are not racist, sometimes even actively supporting racial
equality. Aversive racism, like symbolic racism, is expressed when an alternative
explanation is available, but unlike symbolic racism, aversive racism is theorized to be
more prevalent in political liberals, not conservatives (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
These covert types of racism have also been applied to other forms of prejudice.
Along with their old-fashioned counterparts, researchers have found examples of aversive
sexism (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009), aversive disablism (Deal, 2007), aversive weightism
(Brochu, Gawronski, & Esses, 2011), modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter,
1995), modern homonegativity (Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005), and modern
intellectual disablism (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006).
5

Prejudice Reduction
In response to these multiple forms of prejudice and the multiple ways that these
prejudices can be expressed, psychologists began looking for ways to manipulate or
reduce the levels of prejudice in prejudiced individuals, by either adjusting their attitudes
toward or their beliefs about the group being prejudiced against. These manipulations are
collectively referred to as prejudice reduction techniques.
One of the first to confront prejudice reduction was Gordon Allport. Although he
addressed the issue earlier in relation to personality (Allport, 1945), it was his book, The
Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954), which cemented his theory on prejudice reduction.
In this book, Allport laid out his theory of prejudice, which focused on social and cultural
influences on personality as well as the emergence of the “self” as a member of an
ingroup. Allport also introduced what has become known as the contact hypothesis, his
main theory of prejudice reduction. The contact hypothesis states that, under certain
conditions, contact between an individual and an outgroup member can lead to reduced
prejudice attitudes. Allport identified four contingencies of this contact that needed to be
met for the contact to lead to prejudice reduction: equal status between groups, common
goals, support from authority, and intergroup cooperation (Paluck & Green, 2009).
Allport‟s contact hypothesis laid the foundation for virtually all prejudice reduction
research that came afterwards, with different techniques emphasizing different facets of
his theory.
Extensive support has been found in favor of Allport‟s contact hypothesis.
Intergroup contact has been found to reduce prejudice towards a wide variety of groups,
including immigrants (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009), the Amish (McGuigan & Scholl,
6

2007), the elderly (Hale, 1998), political groups (Popan, Kenworthy, Frame, Lyons, &
Snuggs, 2010), religious groups (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011), and homosexuals (Baunach,
Burgess, & Muse, 2010). Support has also been found for the conditions of contact that
Allport identified, though many studies tend to stress only one or two conditions. For
example, Pettigrew & Tropp‟s (2006) meta-analysis found that studies following
Allport‟s conditions of contact had significantly higher effect sizes than those studies that
did not follow the conditions; they also concluded that support from authority was the
most important condition. However, other researchers have shown evidence that
intergroup cooperation (Molina & Wittig, 2006) can be the most important of Allport‟s
conditions.
In recent years, some researchers have also expanded on the contact hypothesis.
Pettigrew‟s (1998) Intergroup Contact Theory suggests adding the potentiality of
friendship as a fifth condition of contact. Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewe‟s (2005) Parasocial
Contact Hypothesis extends the definition of “contact” to include media consumption,
such as television shows. Liu‟s (2010) Tri-Relational Contact Model states that contact is
important for prejudice reduction not only between individuals but also between
businesses and goods. While these three theories do expand upon Allport‟s original
hypothesis, none of them abandon or even denigrate his ideas except to show the
necessity of their particular additions. Additionally, the recency of these new theories is a
testament to the long-standing impact of Allport‟s theory.
Other researchers have taken the contact hypothesis as a foundation and created
their own techniques for reducing prejudice. Some of these techniques stand alone for
their radical approaches, such as Huang, Sedlovskaya, Ackerman, and Bargh‟s (2011)
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immunization technique and Olson and Fazio‟s (2006) conditioning procedure of
reducing automatic racial prejudice. However, most of the prejudice reduction techniques
that have followed from the contact hypothesis can be grouped into one of two
approaches.
The first of these approaches could be labeled the person-oriented approach.
Techniques that fall under this label seek to reduce or eliminate prejudice by attempting
to change the prejudiced individual‟s attitudes or beliefs. Many person-oriented
techniques rely on awareness interventions, where the prejudiced group is highlighted
and attitudes are presumably changed through increased exposure and understanding of
the group. For example, Johnson and Johnson‟s (2000) “Three C‟s” technique
emphasizes increased knowledge of outgroups along with cooperation, conflict
resolution, and civic values. Aboud and Levy (2000) discuss the benefits of bilingual,
multicultural education and anti-racism programs. Other person-oriented techniques seek
to evoke emotions in the prejudiced individual in an attempt to reduce prejudice. Some
examples of this include the implementation of empathy (Stephan & Finlay, 1999) and
hostile confrontation (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006) as prejudice reduction
techniques.
While the person-oriented approach to prejudice reduction has been successful
(for a brief review, see Paluck & Green, 2009), appealing to an individual‟s emotions or
knowledge is not always effective. For example, Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht (2011)
found that, when they were reminded of the societal pressures controlling prejudice
beliefs, participants actually exhibited more prejudiced attitudes than those who
experienced no intervention. Additionally, person-oriented approaches may not
8

adequately address the more covert types of prejudice. Individuals who exhibit some
forms of covert prejudice, such as aversive racism, are not even aware that they have a
prejudice. Therefore, prejudice reduction techniques that use intervention or emotion as a
base may not be as effective.
The second broad approach that has been used in prejudice reduction research
since Allport is the social groups approach. The social groups approach is focused largely
around the interactions between an individual‟s ingroups, or groups that the individual is
a member of, and the various outgroups (groups that the individual does not belong to)
that the individual encounters. Ingroup research indicates that prejudices are formed, in
part, because of perceived differences between one‟s ingroup and outgroups (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000). These prejudices can form because of pro-ingroup biases (where the
ingroup is viewed more positively than the outgroup), anti-outgroup biases (where the
outgroup is viewed more negatively than the ingroup), or both (Brewer, 2007). The social
groups approach to prejudice reduction attempts to manipulate these ingroup-outgroup
biases, either through decategorization or recategorization.
Decategorization asks the individual to abandon their ingroups and outgroups
altogether and instead judge others based on their individual merits (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2000). Techniques that focus on decategorization rely on small groups or one-on-one
interdependent interactions, usually with the potentiality of friendship. Probably the most
famous decategorization technique is the jigsaw classroom (Aronson, 2004). The jigsaw
classroom forces the child to cooperate with others by breaking schoolwork into pieces
and requiring them to work together in order to learn. The jigsaw creates an
interdependent learning situation which encourages the child to ignore stereotypes,
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establish friendships, and reduce their prejudice attitudes. Decategorization is a common
technique for reducing prejudice (see, for example, Berryman-Fink, 2006; Fiske, 2000;
and Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985), and its utility in reducing prejudice against
specific individuals of an outgroup is well-established.
However, these techniques become troublesome when decategorization is applied
to an entire outgroup. Research has shown that interdependence and decategorization
typically have a strong reduction effect on specific individuals from an outgroup, but that
these individual effects do not generalize well to others from that individual‟s outgroup
(Bratt, 2008; Miller et al., 1985). Because of this, decategorization alone is not the
optimal approach to prejudice reduction when considering an outgroup as a whole.
In contrast to decategorization, which asks the individual to abandon groups altogether,
recategorization asks the individual to recategorize themselves and outgroup members so
that their original ingroup and outgroup become part of a new, more inclusive group
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
The Common Ingroup Identity Model
The current study focuses on one of these social group reorganization techniques:
the Common Ingroup Identity Model. However, before discussing the model itself, two
theories of prejudice that the model is influenced by should be briefly mentioned.
Social Identity Theory
Tajfel and Turner‟s (1979) Social Identity Theory was one of the first major
theories to directly follow from Allport‟s discussion of ingroup bias. Social Identity
Theory (SIT) states that each individual has an identity that they create for themselves
about their place in the social environment and that this social identity is based on a
10

summation of all the social categories that the individual belongs to. Because we all want
to view ourselves in a positive light, SIT posits that people are motivated to create a
positive social identity for themselves, and that this positive identity is formed through
comparisons with outgroups.
SIT also makes a distinction between personal identity and what is termed the
“collective identity” (Hirose, Taresawa, & Okuda, 2005; Hogg & Williams, 2000).
Collective identity refers to the identity created by the individual that is concerned with
the needs and goals of their ingroup as opposed to the needs and goals of the actual
individual. By creating a collective identity, the individual identifies more closely with
those individuals in the ingroup, causing differences within the group to be minimalized
and similarities between the individual and outgroups to be highlighted (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000). In tandem, these two processes lead to intergroup prejudice.
As an example of SIT‟s mechanisms at work, researchers have examined the role
of nationalism in the evocation of a collective identity and the enhancement of prejudiced
attitudes. In a study conducted in Germany, the presence of the German flag increased
outgroup prejudice for participants who were highly nationalistic (Becker, EndersComberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012). A separate study that examined anti-Semitism
in Europe concluded that most anti-Semitic attitudes are based on a nationalistic view
that Jewish people are a threat to the national self-image (Bergmann, 2008). These two
studies exemplify the potential downside of the collective identity: when the individual is
minimized and the group is accentuated, people who are not members of the group can
become victims of prejudiced attitudes.
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This collective identity can also be used as a weapon to combat prejudice. As
previously stated, the collective identity causes individuals within a group to feel more
similar than they actually are (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This, in turn, causes prejudices
against those who are not members of the group, as they are perceived as being more
dissimilar than they actually are. However, a prejudice reduction technique that attempted
to expand the original group to include individuals who were previously categorized as
outgroup members could potentially circumvent the prejudice formation inherent in the
collective identity.
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory
Brewer‟s (1991) Theory of Optimal Distinctiveness expands on research into SIT.
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT) states that an individual forms their social
identity through the contradictory psychological needs of differentiation and assimilation.
In other words, an individual simultaneously wants to feel that they are unique and
different as well as part of a positive and cohesive group. These two processes are
hypothesized to lay on a continuum and that there is a point somewhere in the middle of
the continuum where differentiation and assimilation are being optimally satisfied. This
point is referred to as the point of optimal distinctiveness and it is most easily satisfied by
membership in groups of intermediate size because they allow the individual to feel as if
they are part of a group but that their personal impact can still be felt.
Optimal distinctiveness can also be a cause of intergroup bias. Social groups best
satisfy the needs for belongingness and distinctiveness when they are perceived as being
positive and distinct in relation to outgroups (Brewer, 1991). In turn, these intergroup
comparisons can lead to ingroup favoritism and, consequently, prejudice. ODT has been
12

linked to prejudices based on gender (Eckes, Trautner, & Behrendt, 2005), nationality
(Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007), ethnicity (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer,
Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997), and self-stereotyping (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002).
Common Ingroup Identity
Gaertner and Dovidio‟s (2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model is a social
groups model of prejudice reduction that follows from these two theories of intergroup
prejudice as well as from Allport‟s original contact hypothesis of prejudice reduction.
The Common Ingroup Identity Model states that when members of different groups are
induced to see themselves as members of an overarching, inclusive group rather than as
completely separate groups, attitudes towards former outgroup members will become
more positive by promoting pro-ingroup biases.
Instead of looking to reduce negative outgroup attitudes, the Common Ingroup
Identity Model is focused on extending the benefits of ingroup membership to former
outgroup members. These benefits include ingroup homogeneity (where ingroup
members are viewed as being more similar than they actually are), improved facial
recognition, and increased empathy, positive affect, and helping behaviors (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2000).
While the Common Ingroup Identity Model aims to reduce prejudice through
recategorization, the model does not propose to eliminate these previouslyconceptualized groups. Expecting individuals to completely ignore prejudice-inducing
groups like race, sex, or age is impractical. Instead, the Common Ingroup Identity Model
proposes that we constantly categorize others into many different categories, and, by
making a more inclusive category salient to the individual, those categorizations that
13

promote prejudice attitudes will be superseded (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is also
known as the dual identity model of categorization. Gaertner and Dovidio suggest that,
by allowing for a dual identity, the Common Ingroup Identity Model can account for
generalization problems that have been found with Allport‟s contact hypothesis.
Maintaining a dual identity allows the individual to keep differences between subgroups
in mind while also acknowledging the similarities that bind these subgroups together into
the superordinate group.
A few examples should help to clarify the concepts behind the Common Ingroup
Identity Model. In a study examining the relationship between a common ingroup and
intergroup threat (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010), participants
were asked to indicate how much they perceived Whites and Blacks as one group
(Americans) or as two separate groups (Caucasian-Americans and African-Americans).
Intergroup threat was measured with two scales, one measuring realistic threat
(perceptions of competition) and the other measuring symbolic threat (perceptions of
different values). According to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, participants who
viewed the two racial groups more as one group than as separate groups should have
more positive interracial views and experience less intergroup threat. This is what their
results showed: stronger feelings of a common identity were related to lower levels of
bias, with the relationship being mediated by intergroup threat.
A separate study looked at the effects of a common ingroup identity on nationality
bias in the United Kingdom (Stone & Crisp, 2007). After priming their inherent British
nationality, participants were presented with the outgroup “French people” and the
superordinate identity “European”, meant to include both British and French peoples.
14

Results showed that high identification with the European superordinate group was
associated with more positive feelings about the former outgroup (French people). A
follow-up study found that the relationship between group identification and outgroup
bias was mediated by perceived similarity to the outgroup. Therefore, the significant
finding that high European identification led to more positive feelings to the outgroup
was partially because of an increased feeling of similarity to the former outgroup. This is
congruent with the Common Ingroup Identity Model, which states that perceived
similarity between groups should reduce negative intergroup bias and increase positive
feelings towards the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).
A third example shows the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s applications in the
workplace (Cunningham, 2005). In this study, assistant coaches from various college
sports teams were asked to indicate how cohesive they perceived the coaching staff for
their team to be, with higher cohesion indicating a common ingroup identity. Participants
were then asked to complete a questionnaire about their satisfaction with their coworkers.
Results showed that coworker satisfaction significantly increased as perceptions of a
common ingroup identity increased, further exemplifying the benefits of a common
ingroup identity and extending these benefits to an applied setting.
In summary, the Common Ingroup Identity Model seeks to reduce intergroup
prejudice by creating or highlighting an overarching group that includes both the ingroup
and the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Common ingroup identity primarily aims
not to reduce negative bias against the former outgroup, but to extend the positive bias of
ingroup membership to these former outgroup members. Additionally, by maintaining the
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subgroups that the common ingroup supercedes, the model allows for prejudice reduction
without eliminating the distinctiveness that a subgroup potentially offers its members.
Common Ingroup Identity and specific prejudices. The Common Ingroup
Identity Model has been applied to multiple types of prejudices. When it was originally
conceptualized, the Common Ingroup Identity Model was based around aversive racism
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), and many studies employing the model are centered on
reducing this specific prejudice. For example, in a field experiment at the University of
Delaware, Nier et al. (2001) looked at the impact of a common ingroup identity on survey
compliance at a sports event. In this study, interviewers, half of whom were Black, half
of whom were White, asked people on their way to the game whether they would be
willing to fill out a survey. Common ingroup was manipulated through school affiliation:
half of the interviewers wore a hat with the University of Delaware logo on it, and half of
the interviewers wore a hat with the other team‟s logo on it. The manipulation worked, as
fans complied with the request significantly more often when the interviewer was
affiliated with their school than when they were not. However, there was also an effect of
race: Black interviewers were significantly more likely to be complied with when they
shared the university affiliation with the fan than when they did not, a result that was not
found for White interviewers. This effect was also in the expected direction, with Blacks
sharing a common ingroup being afforded more prosocial behaviors as opposed to Black
outgroup members being shown more negative social behaviors. Similar results for
reducing racism have been found under correlational (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman,
& Anastasio, 1994) and experimental conditions (Dovidio et al., 2004).
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Another common application of the Common Ingroup Identity Model has been in
artificially-induced prejudices between experimentally-created groups (see, for example,
Cunningham & Chelladurai, 2004; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995; Dovidio
et al., 1997, and Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997). An obvious drawback
of these experimentally-created groups is that they are lacking in external validity.
Groups created by the experimenter, by definition, do not exist outside of the experiment.
However, artificial prejudices are popular in prejudice reduction research because of their
ease of manipulation and high internal validity. The ease with which ingroups and
outgroups can be arbitrarily created in experimental settings is indicative of the power of
categorization and recategorization.
The Common Ingroup Identity Model has also been extended to real-life
prejudices outside of racism and laboratory-induced prejudice. For example, Houlette et
al. (2004) examined the effectiveness of the “Green Circle Program”, a prejudice
intervention being implemented at a Delaware elementary school. The Green Circle
program asks children to think about themselves within a “circle” that also includes the
people that the child cares about. After the child creates their circle, the facilitator points
out people that the child may have neglected in their original circle; the child is then
allowed to expand their circle to include these people. As the program progresses, the
child continues to expand their circle until it is inclusive of all humanity. While the Green
Circle program is not a direct product of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the two
share a common goal (prejudice reduction) and a common ground on how to reach that
goal (expanding the ingroup to include those that were previously perceived as
“different”).
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Results from the Green Circle study found that, while they still preferred
playmates that were similar to them, children who participated in the program were more
willing to choose playmates that differed from them, suggesting a broader ingroup in
terms of friend selection (Houlette et al., 2004). Additionally, prejudice reduction was
found not only in terms of racism, but also in regards to sex and weight. The Common
Ingroup Identity Model has also been linked to prejudice reduction in terms of ethnicity
(Levin, Sinclair, Sidanius, & Van Laar, 2009), regionalism (Maas, Ceccarelli, & Rudin,
1996), class status (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009), and political
affiliation (Gaertner et al., 1999). These studies provide evidence of the usefulness of
common ingroup identities outside of experimentally-created prejudices.
Common Ingroup Identity and cognition. Some cognitive processes have been
linked to the Common Ingroup Identity Model. One obvious cognitive process that has
been consistently linked to the model is categorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 2005),
and, more specifically, social categorization (Cunningham, 2005). Social categorization
allows individuals to figure out where they fit into the world by creating distinct
categories and then placing themselves and others into these categories. While this
process is important for the creation of a social identity, it is also conducive to prejudice
through comparisons between ingroups and outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The
Common Ingroup Identity Model uses categorization as a tool for reducing prejudice: by
creating or priming a more inclusive category, differentiation between groups is
eliminated and prejudice is reduced (Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 2010).
A more application-based cognitive mechanism that has been linked to the
Common Ingroup Identity Model is priming. Priming refers to the ability of a stimulus to
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cause a future, related association to be more effectively activated (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2000). In terms of a common ingroup identity, priming refers to the ability of incidental
experiences to trigger thoughts and emotions in relation to ingroups and outgroups, as
well as the potential manipulations of these experiences to reduce prejudice. For example,
one study looked at the effects of ingroup and outgroup designators on evaluations of
positive and negative traits (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). In this study,
participants were primed with pronouns that either denoted an ingroup orientation (e.g.,
“we”, “us”) or an outgroup orientation (e.g., “they”, “them”). Participants were then
asked to evaluate whether a trait was positive (“helpful”, “courteous”) or negative
(“impolite”, “sloppy”). Results indicated a priming effect: participants primed with
ingroup pronouns identified positive traits significantly faster than participants primed
with outgroup pronouns, and participants primed with outgroup pronouns identified
negative traits significantly faster than participants primed with ingroup pronouns.
Need for Closure
One cognitive tool that has not been previously linked to the Common Ingroup
Identity Model is need for closure, also known as need for cognitive closure. Need for
closure (NFC) refers to the motivational need for individuals to find clarity, definition,
and structure in their environments and their interactions with others (Kruglanski,
Webster, & Klem, 1993). Because of this need to find clarity, the individual is urged to
find answers to any ambiguous questions that they encounter, even if this leads them to
inaccurate or factually wrong answers (Taris, 2000). NFC also causes the individual to
shut out information that runs contrary to their currently accepted answer, which, in the
case of incorrect answers, can lead to a stubborn acceptance of false beliefs (Kruglanski
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& Webster, 1996). Individuals high in NFC have been found to prefer quick answers
(Wiersema, van der Schalk, & van Kleef, 2011), view intergroup relations competitively
(De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010), display more group centrism (Orehek et al.,
2010), and prefer order and predictability (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). In contrast,
individuals low in NFC tend to be less decisive, more open-minded, and more creative
(Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004).
NFC is proposed to consist of several sub-processes. Kruglanski and Webster
(1996) describe the process of seizing and freezing that defines the way an individual
high in NFC would process information. Seizing, also known as the urgency tendency,
refers to the individual‟s need to reach a conclusion as quickly as possible, while
freezing, also called the permanence tendency, encourages the individual to persist in
their conclusion by closing it off from any further scrutiny. In tandem, seizing and
freezing are posited to cause reduced information processing and increased stereotyping,
outcomes that are consistent with those linked to high NFC.
Additionally, in creating a scale measuring dispositional NFC, Webster and
Kruglanski (1994) identified five factors: preference for order, preference for
predictability, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness. In terms
of these subscales, individuals high in NFC prefer order and predictability, show more
discomfort with ambiguity, and are more decisive and closed-minded, while individuals
low in NFC score in the opposite direction.
NFC has been identified as a personality variable. As previously mentioned,
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed the Need for Closure Scale with the intent of
measuring individual differences in NFC. The scale has shown high reliability and
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validity, and, along with its obvious implications for NFC research, the scale has been
used in studies measuring such related concepts as information processing style
(Blanchard-Fields, Hertzog, & Horhota, 2012), right-wing attitudes (Onraet, Van Hiel,
Roets, & Cornelis, 2011), religious fundamentalism (Gribbins & Vandenberg, 2011), and
consumer search behavior (Houghton & Grewal, 2000).
However, NFC has also been used as a situation-dependent variable in various
experiments. One common manipulation to heighten NFC is the creation of time pressure
(De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999). By making time pressure salient, such
as by giving participants a deadline to reach a decision, individuals can be induced to
make quick, decisive answers in a similar manner as those who are high in dispositional
NFC. For example, a study by Wiersema et al. (2011) looked at NFC‟s effect on artistic
preferences using participants under time pressure as their high NFC condition. Results
showed that participants under time pressure evaluated figurative paintings significantly
higher than abstract paintings, supporting their hypothesis that participants high in NFC
would prefer art with a clear and obvious meaning. Similar situational inductions of NFC
have been used in studies looking at cognitive structure (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003)
and terrorism (Orehek et al., 2010).
Additionally, while NFC has been found to be a distinct cognitive process, the
construct has been linked to other cognitive processes. In their study examining the
validity of the Need for Closure Scale, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found that NFC
was correlated with, but distinct from, scales measuring such things as authoritarianism,
dogmatism, impulsivity, need for structure, and need for cognition. While many of the
items in these scales appeared to measure similar constructs, the overall processes were
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deemed distinct. For example, NFC and authoritarianism overlapped significantly for
four of the Need for Closure Scale‟s factors, but not for the fifth (closed-mindedness).
The closed-mindedness factor of NFC has also been linked to openness to experience
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). However, while openness to experience is strictly
considered to be a personality trait, NFC is viewed as both a trait and a situationdependent variable.
Need for Closure and Prejudice
Prejudices rely on stereotypical definitions given to entire categories of
individuals or objects. These stereotypes are typically determined through the same types
of shallow processing that are seen in high NFC individuals (Wiersema et al., 2011).
Therefore, with its reliance on closed-mindedness and categorization, and its link to
shallow processing, it is not surprising to find that NFC has been linked to prejudice. In a
study looking at the link between NFC and sexism, Roets, Van Hiel, and Dhont (2011)
found that differences in this cognitive style were predictive of sexist attitudes. A similar
study found a link between NFC, right-wing authoritarianism, and racist attitudes (Van
Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). In both studies, the link was explained through the
processes underlying NFC in general: individuals high in NFC tend to seize an answer
once they find one and then are unwilling to change that answer. In terms of social
groups, this leads high NFC individuals to seize and freeze upon prejudices and
stereotypes as they are the most readily available.
NFC has also been examined in terms of the underlying processes behind
prejudice attitudes. For example, in a study looking at aggression towards an outgroup as
a product of NFC and political affiliation (De Zavala et al., 2010), NFC was found to
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cause an interaction between political affiliation and outgroup hostility, with
conservatives high in NFC responding significantly more aggressively than all other
groups. The researchers posited that, because individuals high in NFC are intolerant of
ambiguous situations, the interaction caused participants to interpret ambiguity as conflict
and to act aggressively in response. Similar studies have found that individuals high in
NFC show increased competitiveness and hostility towards outgroups (De Zavala,
Federico, Cislak, & Sigger, 2008), higher perceptions of racial homophily (Flynn,
Reagans, & Guillory, 2010), and more stereotypical judgments (Dijksterhuis, van
Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996).
NFC has even been suggested as the motivational cognitive process underlying
prejudice that was originally theorized by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). In his book, Allport (1954) discussed a theoretical motivated
cognitive style that creates prejudice-prone individuals. According to Allport, individuals
with this cognitive style would look for quick, definitive answers, be prone to persevering
beliefs, prefer order and familiarity, be more decisive and intolerant of ambiguity, and
exhibit closed-mindedness. These exact traits have been discussed as the underlying
mechanisms and subsets of NFC. Allport also stated that individuals with this cognitive
style would believe social groups were more homogenous than they actually were;
studies on NFC have shown that individuals high in NFC perceive groups to be more
homogenous (Dijksterhuis, et al., 1996; Flynn et al., 2010). While Allport‟s eerie
accuracy in predicting this cognitive style is impressive, the more important implications
of these findings are that NFC has a definitive motivational tie to prejudice attitudes.
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Need for Closure and Prejudice Reduction
While research into NFC‟s effect on prejudice reduction techniques has only
recently just begun, preliminary studies suggest that NFC may be a surprising moderator
for the effectiveness of prejudice reduction. For example, Dhont, Roets, and Van Hiel
(2011) conducted five studies on the moderating effects of NFC on the prejudice
reduction capabilities of intergroup contact. In each of these studies, a moderation effect
was found, with participants high in NFC being more responsive to intergroup contact as
a means of reducing prejudice than participants low in NFC. These findings seem to run
counter to the theory behind NFC: individuals high in the construct should seemingly
seize and freeze upon their stereotypical beliefs and, therefore, be less responsive to
prejudice reduction techniques. However, the authors propose that intergroup contact as a
prejudice reduction technique is able to avoid the tendency to seize and freeze because
contact does not confront the individual with what is “right” or “wrong”. Intergroup
contact also allows the individual high in NFC to reduce their ambiguity about a
stereotype by clarifying or fixing their stereotypical construct.
To my knowledge, this is the only study that has examined the relationship
between NFC and prejudice reduction. However, the findings of this study give a
direction to future research into this relationship. The results support research into other
techniques stemming from intergroup contact, suggesting that techniques relevant to
contact may be more effective for individuals with high levels of NFC. The results also
suggest that high NFC may increase the effectiveness of prejudice reduction techniques,
which seems counterintuitive but is empirically supported (Dhont et al., 2011). Of course,
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these directions are reliant on a single article that discusses five studies, so more research
is necessary to improve the validity of the research.
Rationale
The biggest problem facing the Common Ingroup Identity Model is its
applicability outside of the laboratory and over a long-term basis. The model has found
considerable evidence in experimental settings, using both artificial and real social
groups. However, some have questioned the real-world feasibility of a prejudice
reduction technique that aims to supersede such powerful, socially-ingrained categories
as race, sex, and ethnicity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The study of cognitive variables
such as NFC in terms of the Common Ingroup Identity Model could help identify what
situations and dispositions enhance the effectiveness of the model in the real world.
Situations inducing NFC, such as salience of terrorism (Orehek et al., 2010) and time
pressure (De Grada et al., 1999), have been shown to enhance both ingroup identification
and interdependence with others. In terms of disposition, high levels of NFC have
previously been linked to higher levels of effectiveness with other prejudice reduction
techniques (Dhont et al., 2011). Therefore, in a real world setting, the Common Ingroup
Identity Model could be tailored more effectively if used in tandem with a heightened
NFC situation (such as time pressure) or if targeted towards high NFC individuals
specifically.
Hypotheses
Based on previous findings about the effects of inducing a common ingroup
identity on prejudice attitudes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), I predicted that participants
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who were asked to think of an outgroup member as part of a shared ingroup would
exhibit lower levels of prejudice attitudes than participants who were not asked to do so.
Additionally, based on previous research into NFC and prejudice (De Zavala et al., 2008;
Orehek et al., 2010), I predicted that participants high in dispositional NFC would exhibit
higher levels of prejudice attitudes than participants low in dispositional NFC. I also
predicted that participants in a time pressure situation (a manipulation shown to invoke
heightened NFC; De Grada et al., 1999) would exhibit higher levels of prejudice attitudes
than participants under normal circumstances.
Finally, based on the preliminary link between NFC and prejudice reduction
(Dhont et al., 2011), and the links between the Common Ingroup Identity Model and
cognition (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), I predicted that NFC would moderate the
effectiveness of the Common Ingroup Identity Model on prejudice reduction.
Specifically, I predicted that participants with higher levels of dispositional NFC would
be more responsive to the intervention than participants with lower levels of NFC. I also
predicted that participants induced into a high NFC state would be more responsive to the
intervention than participants not so induced. Finally, I predicted that participants high in
dispositional NFC who are induced into a high NFC state would show the largest
decrease in prejudice attitudes under the Common Ingroup Identity Model.
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CHAPTER III

METHOD

Participants
Participants were 44 undergraduate students (9 males, 35 females; 4 AfricanAmericans, 40 Caucasians) at Eastern Kentucky University who were given partial
course credit for their participation in the study. Participants were recruited online via the
EKU Sona system. Participants were randomly assigned to a Time Pressure condition (19
Time Pressure, 25 No Pressure) and an Ingroup condition (20 Ingroup, 24 Outgroup).
Average age was 20.6 (SD = 5.0).
Additionally, 300 undergraduate students at EKU participated in the online
version of part one of the study. Participation in the online version of part one did not
require participation in part two; therefore, only 18 of these participants were used to test
the hypotheses. However, these participants were included in the post-hoc validation of
the fifteen-item Need for Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Demographic
information was not collected for part one participants unless they completed part two.
Materials
Dispositional Need for Closure
Dispositional NFC was measured using a fifteen-item version of the Need for
Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b; Cronbach‟s  = .87). The fifteen-item scale was
developed from Webster & Kruglanski‟s (1994) original, 42-item Need for Closure
Scale. Example items from this scale are, “I don‟t like situations that are uncertain”, and
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“When I have made a decision, I feel relieved” (see Appendix A for all items).
Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly
agree). Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall
higher scores indicating higher levels of NFC. For data used to test the hypotheses, mean
ratings were 3.44 (SD = .63); for data used in the post-hoc validation, mean ratings were
3.52 (SD = .53). For use in the MANOVA analysis, a dichotomous variable was created,
splitting participants into a high or low condition that was determined by the overall
median (3.40).
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem was measured using a ten-item version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem
scale (Rosenberg, 1965; Cronbach‟s  = .91). Example items from this scale are, “I feel
that I have a number of good qualities,” and “I wish I could have more respect for
myself” (see Appendix B for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 were reversecoded. Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall
higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. For data used in the post-hoc validation,
mean ratings on this scale were 3.89 (SD = .79).
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness was measured using a ten-item version of the
conscientiousness subscale of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992; Cronbach‟s
 = .82). Example items from this scale are, “I am always prepared,” and “I make a mess

of things” (see Appendix C for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 2, 6, 8, and 10 were reverse28

coded. Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall
higher scores indicating higher levels of conscientiousness. For data used in the post-hoc
validation, mean ratings on this scale were 3.53 (SD = .65).
Extraversion
Extraversion was measured using a ten-item version of the extraversion subscale
of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992; Cronbach‟s  = .92). Example items
from this scale are, “I feel comfortable around people,” and “I am quiet around strangers”
(see Appendix D for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert scale (1 =
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 10 were reverse-coded. Mean
ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall higher scores
indicating higher levels of extraversion. For data used in the post-hoc validation, mean
ratings on this scale were 3.14 (SD = .90).
Guilt Questionnaire
Prejudice was measured using a five-item Guilt Questionnaire (Appendix E). This
questionnaire was administered as the operational definition of the dependent variable,
meant to measure prejudice. The questionnaire was adapted from a similar design used by
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000), with items tailored to better fit a scenario involving the
Olympics. The first four items on the scale are, “The results of the tests conducted by the
IOC are probably correct,” “I believe Mendoza when he says that he is clueless as to the
test results,” “I believe that Mendoza is guilty of doping,” and “Mendoza should have
been stripped of his medal.” The fifth item of the scale asks participants to indicate which
punishment they believe that the athlete should receive. Participants rated items using a
7-point Likert scale (for items 1-4, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; for item 5,
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choices are the severity of punishment, from 1 = no punishment, to 7 = lifetime ban). Item
2 was reverse-coded. Mean ratings on items 1-4 were obtained for each participant, with
overall higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice attitudes (M = 4.81, SD =
1.21). Higher scores on item 5 indicate more severe levels of punishment (M = 3.45, SD
= 1.45).
Big-Five Personality Test
A 100-item version of the Big Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992) was present
in the study to enhance the time pressure manipulation. The questionnaire was not
actually administered in the study, but a stack of the questionnaire was kept on the table
near the researcher. See Appendix F for all items. The questionnaire uses a 9-point Likert
scale (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate), with higher scores indicating
higher levels of that personality dimension. The presence of this questionnaire was
simply to create the illusion that the participant had more surveys to fill out than they
actually do, which may have increased feelings of time pressure for participants in the
time pressure condition.
Procedure
The procedure for the current study underwent two notable changes. Participant
recruitment was taking significantly longer than expected under the original procedure, so
a procedural change was made to put part one of the study online. After this change was
implemented, participant recruitment remained at an extremely low rate. Therefore, a
second procedural change was made to allow part two (which required in-person
participation) to be visible on the sign-up list prior to completion of Part One.
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Protocol One
Participants signed up for the study online via the Sona system, where it was
listed under the name "Personality and the Olympics." The study consisted of two parts,
both of which were conducted in-person. Participants signed up for both parts upon initial
sign up.
After participants arrived for Part One of the study, I handed out the Part One
Consent Forms (Appendix G) and followed this script:
Hello. My name is Bradlee Gamblin. I am a graduate student here at EKU, and
this study is for my graduate thesis. Thank you for coming today. This is part one
of a two-part study. Before we begin, I will read you the consent form that you
were given when you arrived. You are welcome to read along if you would like.
(Read Consent Form). In part one of this study, you will be asked to fill out four
short surveys about your personality. Please do not write your name on the
surveys. Do you have any questions before we begin? (Answer questions). We will
now begin. Your responses are anonymous, and there are no right or wrong
answers. Please try to be honest.
Participants were then given the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and a version of the
Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test
(Goldberg, 1992). After completing the surveys, participants were given the Part One
Debriefing Form (Appendix H) which explained what the four scales measured and
reminded them that they still needed to complete part two of the study.
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When participants arrived for the second part of the study, I handed out the Part
Two Consent Forms (Appendix I) and followed this script:
Hello. My name is Bradlee Gamblin. I am a graduate student here at EKU. Thank
you for participating in my study today. Before we begin, I will read you the
consent form that you were given when you arrived. You are welcome to read
along if you would like. (Read Consent Form). In this study, you will be asked to
read an article about something that happened at this past summer’s Olympic
Games. The passage is from an Associated Press news article printed in the
Lexington Herald-Leader. You will then be asked to fill out a questionnaire
pertaining to what you have read as well as a few questionnaires about your
personality. Please do not write your name on any of the questionnaires. Do you
have any questions before we begin? (Answer questions). We will now begin. The
purpose of this study is to find out opinions on some procedures used in this
summer’s Olympics. Your responses are anonymous, and there are no right or
wrong answers. Please try to be honest.
Participants were then presented with a simulated news article (Appendices J and
K). For participants in the Ingroup condition, the athlete was labeled as being from the
United States. For participants in the Outgroup condition, the accused was simply
referred to as an Olympic athlete. There were no other differences in the article between
conditions. This ingroup manipulation was based on past research that has shown that a
common ingroup can have an effect on opinions (Stone & Crisp, 2007) as well as
research into aversive racism in the courtroom (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).
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After the participants read the article, they were asked to summarize the article
using a Summary Sheet they were provided (Appendix L). The purpose of the summary
was to give participants an opportunity to re-read the article and, potentially, take further
note of the athlete‟s status as either an outgroup or an ingroup member. After participants
had completed their summary, the situational NFC manipulation was implemented. A
similar procedure to that used by De Grada et al. (1999) was followed. For participants in
the Time Pressure condition, I followed this script:
Now you will answer a few questionnaires about this crime and fill out a
personality questionnaire. Before you all arrived today, the janitors came up to
me and told me that they would need to clean this room at about (state the time
that the study began). I informed them that I had already scheduled the room for
research at that time, but that I would let you all know and try to finish with
enough time for them to clean. I am only telling you because there’s another
group coming in at (state the next 30-minute block of time), and I want to try to let
them in here between your two groups. Of course, still answer to the best of your
ability and answer honestly.
Participants in the No Pressure condition were only informed that they would be
answering a few questionnaires and given a reminder to answer honestly.
After the time pressure manipulation was implemented, participants were given a
questionnaire assessing the guilt of the athlete from the article (Appendix E). The
questionnaire was adapted from a similar design used by Sommers and Ellsworth (2000),
with items tailored to better fit the Olympic scenario. Participants were then given a
demographics sheet (Appendix M).
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At this point, the study was complete. Participants were then given the Part Two
Debriefing Form (Appendix N), which I read to them. After asking for and answering any
questions the participants had, I thanked them for participating in the study and informed
them that they were free to leave.
Protocol Two
A procedural change was implemented one month into data collection in an
attempt to increase participant sign-up rates. Participants seemed hesitant to sign up for a
study that required committing to two in-person meetings, and studies conducted online
(at least at EKU) have much higher participation rates than those conducted in-person.
Therefore, the study was changed from being listed as one study with two in-person
meetings to two separate studies, with Part One being conducted online and Part Two
being conducted in-person.
Under Protocol 2, participants signed up for Part One of the study online under
the name "College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities." Part One was
administered online via the EKU Sona system.
After participants signed up for the study, the study automatically began.
Participants were first presented with the Online Consent Form (Appendix O), which was
slightly modified from the original Part One Consent Form (Appendix G) to indicate that
Part One was now being listed as a separate study.
Participants then completed the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011b), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and a version of the
Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test
(Goldberg, 1992). After completing the surveys, participants were presented with the
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Online Debriefing Form (Appendix P), which explained what the four scales measured
and informed them that a separate study (part two of the full study) was available for
sign-up. Because the original protocol explicitly told participants that parts one and two
were related to each other, the mention of the second study does not seem to create a
confound. After being presented with their debriefing forms, participants had completed
Part One.
Once participants had completed Part One of the study, a separate study, entitled
“Psychology at the Olympic Games,” was made available to them on the Sona system.
This study represented Part Two of the full study, and was conducted in-person.
When participants arrived, they were given an In-Person Consent Form
(Appendix Q). The remaining procedure for Part Two was identical to that used in the
original protocol, except that the debriefing form was slightly changed to reflect the
administration of Part One online (see Appendix R) and the 15-item Need for Closure
scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) was administered a second time in order to look for
differences in NFC scores between the Time Pressure and No Pressure conditions.
Protocol Three
A second procedural change was made one month after Protocol Two had been
implemented. Again, this change was done in an attempt to increase participation in the
study.
The only change between Protocol Two and Protocol Three was that participants
were able to view and sign up for Part Two of the full study before having completed Part
One. This change was made in order to allow Part Two to be visible to participants upon
their initial viewing of the EKU Sona sign-up page. I feared that participants were
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signing up for all of their studies at once and were therefore never seeing Part Two at all
(since Part Two was invisible to participants until they had completed Part One).
Other than this change, the procedure for Protocol Three was the same as Protocol Two.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Dependent Measures
Before testing the hypotheses, preliminary analyses were conducted on the
dependent variables to test for reliability and similarity. First, a reliability analysis was
conducted on the four items of the Guilt Questionnaire to test for inter-item consistency.
Results showed a Cronbach‟s  of .89, indicating good internal consistency.
Next, bivariate correlations were obtained between the Guilt Questionnaire and
the Punishment variable. Logically, participants who assign higher levels of guilt to the
athlete should also assign higher levels of punishment to the athlete. Results confirmed
this, showing that Guilt was positively correlated with Punishment (r = .56, p = .00),
indicating a significant and moderate relationship between the two dependent variables.
The strong relationship between the two dependent variables may suggest that
they should be collapsed into a single variable. However, they measure separate
constructs. The four items of the Guilt variable asked participants for their attitudes
towards the athlete, while the Punishment item asked participants to assign a level of
punishment to the athlete. Therefore, the variables were kept separate to test the
hypotheses, and multivariate analyses were conducted.
Hypothesis Analysis
To test the hypothesized main effects of the ingroup manipulation, time pressure
manipulation, and dispositional NFC, and the hypothesized interactions between these
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variables, on the Guilt and Punishment dependent variables, a 2 X 2 X 2 Multivariate
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Specifically, I expected to find that
participants in the Ingroup condition would have lower scores on the DVs than the
Outgroup condition, that participants in the No Pressure condition would have lower
scores on the DVs than the Time Pressure condition, that participants low in
dispositional-NFC would have lower scores on the DVs than participants high in
dispositional-NFC, that participants high in dispositional-NFC or in a high-NFC situation
would be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, and that participants
high in dispositional-NFC who were in a high-NFC situation would be the most
responsive to the model.
Results of the multivariate omnibus tests yielded a significant main effect of
Ingroup, F = 3.61, p = .04, 2 = .22, but no significant main effects for Time Pressure, F
= 1.65, ns (for Punishment, MTimePressure = 3.29, SD = .39, MNoPressure = 3.50, SD = .31; for
Guilt, MTimePressure = 5.07, SD = .35, MNoPressure = 4.53, SD = .27), or Dispositional NFC, F
= .24, ns (for Punishment, MLowNFC = 3.23, SD = .31, MHighNFC = 3.56, SD = .39; for Guilt,
MLowNFC = 4.76, SD = .28, MHighNFC = 4.84, SD = .34). The omnibus tests also revealed no
significant interactions between any two of the three variables (FIngroupXTimePressure = .44,
FIngroupXDispositional = 1.00, FTimePressureXDispositional = .60, all ps ns); however, the three-way
interaction revealed a finding approaching significance, F = 2.53, p = .10, 2 = .16.
Therefore, follow-up univariate tests were conducted for the Ingroup main effect and the
three-way interaction effect.
The results of the univariate tests revealed no significant main effect of Ingroup
on either Punishment (F = 3.19, ns; MIngroup = 2.95, SD = .36; MOutgroup = 3.84, SD = .34)
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or the Guilt Questionnaire (F = .43, ns; MIngroup = 4.94, SD = .32; MOutgroup = 4.66, SD =
.31). Results also showed no significant three-way interaction for Punishment (F = 3.97,
ns). However, a significant interaction was found for scores on the Guilt Questionnaire (F
= 4.31, p = .05, 2 = .14). Participants in the No Pressure condition who were high in
Dispositional NFC evaluated the athlete as being more guilty when they were told that he
was an American (M = 5.70, SD = .53) than those who were not (M = 3.79, SD = .45),
while participants low in Dispositional NFC gave the athlete higher guilt ratings when no
country of origin was specified (M = 4.88, SD = .59) than when he was labeled as an
American (M = 3.75, SD = .59) (see Figures 1 and 2). In comparison, Guilt scores were
relatively stable across Ingroup conditions and dispositional NFC for participants in the
Time Pressure condition. These results suggest that, without time pressure, participants
respond differently to the Common Ingroup Identity Model depending on their levels of
dispositional NFC.
While these results are significant, they are in the opposite direction predicted by
the current study‟s hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis that participants high in
dispositional NFC who are placed in a high NFC situation will be most responsive to the
Common Ingroup Identity Model was not supported.
Post-hoc Analyses
Two-Way Univariate Analysis of Variance
Results showed a p-value approaching significance for the three-way interaction
of Ingroup, Time Pressure, and Dispositional NFC, and univariate analyses revealed a
significant three-way interaction for Guilt in which participants in the Time Pressure
condition showed fairly stable scores regardless of Ingroup condition or dispositional
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Guilt Scores

Figure 1. Ingroup X Time Pressure Effect on Guilt Scores for Low-NFC Participants.

Guilt Scores

Figure 2. Ingroup X Time Pressure Effects on Guilt Scores for High-NFC Participants.
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NFC, while participants in the No Pressure condition showed inverse reactions to the
Ingroup manipulation dependent upon their dispositional NFC level. Therefore, it was
hypothesized that, when excluding participants in the Time Pressure condition, a
significant interaction would be found between Ingroup and Dispositional NFC for Guilt.
Specifically, I predicted that participants high in dispositional NFC would score higher
on the Guilt Questionnaire when in the Ingroup condition, and that participants low in
dispositional NFC would score higher on the Guilt Questionnaire when in the Outgroup
condition.
To test this hypothesis, a 2 X 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted
on participants in the No Pressure condition, with Dispositional NFC and Ingroup as the
independent variables and Guilt scores as the dependent variable. Results revealed a
significant interaction effect, F = 8.09, p = .01, 2 = .34. A simple main effect analysis
was conducted to test for mean differences in the Ingroup condition between participants
high and low in NFC. As predicted, participants high in NFC had higher Guilt scores (M
= 5.70, SD = .69) than participants low in NFC (M = 3.75, SD = 1.88) (see Figure 3).
Although this difference was not statistically significant (t = -2.17, p = .07), this is likely
due to the very low numbers that each cell had been reduced to after eliminating
participants in both the Time Pressure and Outgroup conditions. Therefore, the post-hoc
hypothesis that, when not under time pressure, participants respond to the Common
Ingroup Identity Model inversely depending on their level of dispositional NFC was
partially supported.
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Guilt Scores

Figure 3. Ingroup X Dispositional NFC Effects on Guilt Scores, Excluding Time
Pressure.

Validation of the 15-Item Need for Closure Scale
Once Protocol Two was implemented, Part One of the study was administered
completely online. This new protocol changed the presentation of the full study from one
two-part study into two separate studies, allowing participants to complete Part One
without being obligated to complete Part Two. Because of this, as well as the much
higher participation rate for online studies at EKU in comparison to in-person studies, the
vast majority of participants who completed Part One online (282 out of 300) were not
used to test the hypotheses. However, these participants were able to be used in a posthoc validation of the new 15-item Need for Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
A reliability analysis was conducted to test for inter-item consistency. Results showed a
Cronbach‟s  of .80, indicating good internal consistency for the measure. In their
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analysis, Roets and Van Hiel (2011b) found a Cronbach‟s  of .87, a similar (if slightly
higher) coefficient.
Next, bivariate correlation analyses were conducted between the 15-item Need for
Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) and conscientiousness and extraversion, two
variables that have been previously linked to NFC. Results showed that NFC was
positively correlated with conscientiousness (r = .24, p = .00) and negatively correlated
with extraversion (r = -.16, p = .01). Roets and Van Hiel‟s validation study found similar
results for conscientiousness, but their analysis indicated no significant relationship with
extraversion. This may be the result of a difference between the extraversion and
conscientiousness scales: the versions used in the current study are only ten items long
and were originally chosen as simple filler surveys.
Finally, a confirmatory factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted to
test the five-factor structure of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b). The original 42-item Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) has
been found to consist of five factors. Results showed that 11 of the 15 items loaded onto
their associated factors: Factor 1 was Preference for Order, Factor 2 was Preference for
Predictability, Factor 3 was Closed-Mindedness, Factor 4 was Decisiveness, and Factor 5
was Discomfort with Ambiguity (see Table 1 for factor loadings). Eigenvalues for the
five factors were 4.30, 1.49, 1.39, 1.23, and 0.89, respectively, and they explained over
62% of the variance in the items.
The fact that four of the items did not load onto their respective factors is not
necessarily problematic. While the items on the 15-item scale were chosen to include 3
items from each of the five factors, each specific item was chosen because of its
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Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 15-Item Need for
Closure Scale.
Predicted
Order
Predictability
ClosedDecisiveness Discomfort
Item Factors
Mindedness
with
Ambiguity
Order 1
.207
-.017
.140
.166
.785
Order 2
.136
.071
.091
.084
.838
Order 3
.106
.112
.058
.043
.851
Predictability
.212
.064
.233
.111
.681
1
Predictability
.051
.421
.113
-.055
.613
2
Predictability
.351
.362
.065
.149
.608
3
Closed.065
.097
.220
-.012
.800
Mindedness 1
Closed.186
-.030
.118
.057
.667
Mindedness 2
Closed-.058
-.010
-.139
.107
.638
Mindedness 3
Decisiveness
.054
-.027
-.212
.142
.704
1
Decisiveness
.197
.226
.088
-.072
.719
2
Decisiveness
.025
.353
.284
.019
.610
3
Ambiguity 1
.159
.119
-.076
.078
.814
Ambiguity 2
.071
-.116
.062
.057
.783
Ambiguity 3
.175
.254
.306
.350
.486
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relevance to NFC overall, not because it was representative of the factor. Roets and Van
Hiel (2011b) actually envisioned their shortened Need for Closure Scale as consisting of
one dimension. Therefore, it is impressive that a CFA is still capable of loading most of
the items onto their corresponding factors and makes the shortened scale even more
similar to the original than the authors may have anticipated.
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CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is an important
contribution to prejudice reduction research. When applicable, the model provides a
systematic tool for subverting negative outgroup stereotypes and avoiding group biases.
The process of recategorization forces the individual or group to think about previous
outgroup members as being a part of a shared ingroup. This shared ingroup is the catalyst
for prejudice reduction in the model: pro-ingroup biases that were originally used by the
individual to create favoritism against the outgroup members is now employed in tandem
with the previous outgroup members, affording them prosocial benefits such as improved
face recognition and increased empathy.
However, translating the well-documented laboratory results supporting the
Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to real-world situations can
be problematic. For example, Rutchick and Eccleston (2010) investigated the effects of a
common ingroup identity on persuasive appeals made by outgroup members. Their
results showed that, because Democrats and Republicans conceive of the superordinate
group “Americans” differently, a persuasive appeal from the political outgroup was not
convincing when they invoked a common ingroup. A similar limitation to the model has
been found in relation to Hurricane Katrina (Dach-Gruschow & Hong, 2006). Other
limitations include the impact of the subgroup‟s perceived role in the superordinate group
(Sindic & Reicher, 2009), the impact of subgroup homogeneity on superordinate-level
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bias (Cunningham, 2006), and the creation of new, shared outgroup conflicts once a
common ingroup has been formed (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001).
Investigating cognitive variables, such as NFC, in relation to the Common
Ingroup Identity Model enables researchers the opportunity to account for at least some
of the variation that the model would encounter in real-life scenarios. Some aspects of
cognition, such as categorization (Cunningham, 2005) and priming (Perdue et al., 1990),
have been previously linked to the model. However, the relationship between the model
and NFC, a motivational need to find clarity and structure (Kruglanski et al., 1993), had
not been previously explored. Because of its known ties to prejudice (e.g., De Zavala et
al., 2010) and preliminary links to another prejudice reduction technique (Dhont et al.,
2011), the current study looked into a potential link between NFC and the Common
Ingroup Identity Model.
The current study investigated the effects of both dispositional (Kruglanski et al.,
1993) and situational (De Grada et al., 1999) NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity
Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Specifically, I predicted that individuals evaluating
an athlete under a common ingroup label would assess him more favorably than
individuals who were given no ingroup label. I also predicted that individuals low in
either dispositional or situational NFC would give more favorable assessments than
individuals high in NFC. Finally, I predicted three interactions: individuals high in either
dispositional or situational NFC would be more responsive to the model than individuals
low in NFC, and individuals high in both dispositional and situational NFC would show
the largest decrease in prejudice attitudes under the model.

47

Results of the current study found support for none of the proposed hypotheses. In
terms of both situational and dispositional NFC, no significant relationship was found for
either the prejudice or discrimination measures. This goes against previous findings about
dispositional NFC‟s ties to prejudice (De Zavala et al., 2010; Flynn et al., 2010), although
past research has not looked at dispositional NFC‟s links to prejudice in terms of a
target‟s guilt. Therefore, the current study provides evidence that dispositional NFC‟s
known relationship with prejudice and discrimination may not extend to the realm of
guilt assessment or punishment administration. On the other hand, situational NFC‟s link
to prejudice and discrimination has not previously been examined. Therefore, the current
study suggests that situational NFC does not share dispositional NFC‟s direct relationship
with prejudice or discrimination.
Additionally, while multivariate omnibus results revealed a significant effect of
the ingroup manipulation, univariate analyses failed to find significance for either of the
two dependent variables. These results go against the vast majority of findings in support
of the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s impact on prejudice and discrimination (e.g.,
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), suggesting another potential boundary condition for the
model related to evaluations of guilt. However, the punishment variable did approach
significance, with lower scores being found in the Ingroup condition. This indicates a
trend in the data in the direction of the proposed hypothesis, and, given a larger
participant pool, results for the punishment variable may have reached significance.
The predicted two-way interactions between situational and dispositional NFC
and the Common Ingroup Identity Model were also not supported by the data. As there
has been only one previous study into NFC‟s effects on prejudice reduction (Dhont et al.,
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2011), and the prejudice reduction technique used in that study was different than the one
used here, these results do not go against any previous findings. However, the current
study does suggest that the results of the previous study, which showed that individuals
higher in NFC were more responsive to intergroup contact, cannot be generalized to
prejudice reduction techniques in general. However, this does not necessarily mean that
the findings of the prior study are isolated only to intergroup contact. There are
significant differences between intergroup contact and common ingroup identity as
prejudice reduction methods: intergroup contact explicitly relies on interactions with an
outgroup member (Allport, 1954), while the Common Ingroup Identity Model attempts to
cognitively subvert the outgroup label altogether through the process of recategorization
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Therefore, the results of the current study only suggest that
NFC‟s effects on prejudice reduction may be limited to techniques that rely on contact.
The predicted three-way interaction between situational NFC, dispositional NFC,
and the Common Ingroup Identity Model was also not supported. However, a result
approaching significance was found in the multivariate omnibus tests, and univariate
results revealed an interesting, unpredicted three-way interaction for the Guilt DV.
Participants in the Time Pressure condition appear to give relatively stable scores
regardless of dispositional-NFC and Ingroup condition; however, participants in the No
Pressure condition showed inverse reactions to the common ingroup manipulation, which
was dependent on their levels of dispositional-NFC.
In other words, the effects of dispositional-NFC and the Ingroup manipulation
seem to have been washed out when participants were placed into the time pressure
condition, causing participants to rate the athlete‟s guilt based on something other than
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their NFC levels or the athlete‟s ingroup status. For example, a potential criterion that
participants may have used under time pressure was an evaluation of the merits of the
two arguments given in the article.
Conversely, when participants were placed into the No Pressure condition, they
had enough time to both evaluate the athlete‟s ingroup status and allow the effects of
dispositional NFC to distort their evaluations of the athlete‟s guilt. Under this
assumption, it appears that participants responded in opposite directions to the Ingroup
manipulation depending on whether they were high or low in dispositional NFC, with
participants high in NFC rating the athlete as more guilty when a common ingroup
identity was evoked. A post-hoc analysis, which excluded participants in the Time
Pressure condition, supported this. Therefore, the current study suggests that, under
normal conditions, while the model is effective for individuals low in dispositional NFC,
the use of a common ingroup identity to reduce prejudice in individuals high in
dispositional NFC may actually cause an increase in prejudice.
Finally, a post-hoc validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011b) was able to replicate most of the findings of the original validation study,
including good reliability and a positive correlation with conscientiousness. A
confirmatory factor analysis was also able to correctly extract the majority of the fivefactor model that the original Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) is
theorized to consist of. Therefore, the current study was able to give support to the use of
the shortened scale as a valid replacement of the original, 42-item scale.
Overall, the current study adds to the literature on NFC‟s ties to prejudice and
prejudice reduction, to the literature on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, and to the
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literature on the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Results
indicate that the relationship between NFC and prejudice may not extend to the realms of
guilt and punishment. Additionally, NFC‟s tentative link to prejudice reduction may be
limited to those methods involving intergroup contact, as no effect was found between
NFC and the Common Ingroup Identity Model. If anything, participants high in
dispositional NFC may actually respond negatively to the evocation of a common ingroup
identity. Results also revealed guilt and punishment assessment as potential boundary
conditions of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, although a larger participant pool
likely would have found significance for the punishment variable. Finally, a post-hoc
validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale provided evidence to support its use in
place of the original, 42-item scale.
Limitations
The major limitation of the current study is that there are not enough participants
per cell to expect much in the way of significant findings. The minimum suggested
number of participants needed in order to draw real conclusions is 20 per cell (Simmons,
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011); in contrast, the current study varied between 7 and 2
participants per cell in the three-way interaction. Because of this, all results, both
significant and insignificant, should be viewed as preliminary and only suggestive of a
potential trend that the results may follow once more data have been collected.
Another limitation of the current study is that the participant pool being used is
not representative of the general population. For example, data on demographics revealed
that the sample was 76% female and 87% Caucasian, numbers that do not match those of
the rest of the United States. Additionally, all participants were undergraduate students at
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EKU who were enrolled in a psychology course, making generalization to non-collegiates
and other geographic areas even more problematic. Future research should explore a
more diverse population, consisting of a more proportional number of men and noncollegiate individuals.
A third limitation to the current study is that small procedural changes were
implemented in the midst of data collection. Originally, the study was conceived as an inperson study, administered at two separate points in time. This was changed to put the
first part of the study online; later, mandatory completion of Part One before Part Two
was removed in order to increase visibility of the second part of the study. These
procedural changes were done in an attempt to increase participant interest in the study,
as participants seemed hesitant to sign up for a study requiring two in-person meetings.
The decision was at least a partial success: 26 participants signed up for Part Two of the
study since the first procedural change, and 300 participants signed up for the online
version of Part One. While most of those 300 participants could not be used for the
primary analysis, I was able to include them in a post-hoc analysis that tested the validity
of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Regardless, these
procedural changes should be noted and considered when discussing the results of the
study.
A fourth limitation is that the manipulations may not have been strong enough.
The common ingroup manipulation relied only on the addition of five mentions of the
United States within a page-long story that otherwise had nothing to do with the athlete‟s
country of origin. Therefore, the ingroup manipulation may not have been strong enough
to force the participant to view the athlete as an ingroup member. The time pressure
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manipulation may also have been problematic. One explanation for a failure to induce
time pressure is that participants are expecting odd situations to arise during their
participation in psychological studies and, therefore, assumed that the time pressure
speech was part of the study. Another potential explanation is that participants simply did
not feel rushed by the janitor scenario, either because it was unbelievable or because they
were not concerned about finishing in time. Insignificant results between the Time
Pressure and No Pressure conditions suggest that one of these explanations may be true;
if so, future research will want to use a stronger time pressure manipulation.
A fifth limitation of the current study has to do with the dependent variables. The
current study proposed to investigate the impact of NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity
Model‟s ability to reduce feelings of prejudice towards an outgroup. However, the
dependent variables were based upon the evaluation of a single outgroup individual.
While the Guilt Questionnaire did ask for participants attitudes towards the athlete, none
of the attitude questions were directed towards the athlete‟s outgroup in general (i.e., “I
would expect athletes like Mendoza to be cheaters,” or “Just looking at Mendoza, I would
think he was a cheater.”). The Punishment variable was explicitly a measure of
discrimination, not prejudice, because it was concerned with a participant‟s actions, not
their beliefs. Therefore, the amount of strictly prejudicial attitudes that was measured in
the current study is debatable.
Pertaining to the post-hoc validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets
& Van Hiel, 2011b), a few limitations are worth mentioning. First, no demographic
information was collected in the current study for participants in the online version of
Part One unless they went on to participate in Part Two. Therefore, demographic
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information is essentially unknown for the post-hoc sample. Second, the
Conscientiousness and Extraversion scales that were used in the correlational analysis
each included only ten items and were originally included in the study to give the
participant extra work to do and diffuse the relationship between the scale and the rest of
the study. Because of this, and potential differences between the Conscientiousness and
Extraversion scales used in the original study, the differences in significance and strength
between the current study and the original study are not necessarily indicative of a
problem with the shortened version of the scale. Finally, only two scales were used in the
correlational analysis. Ideally, the correlational section of the analysis would have
included more variables with known links to NFC, as well as the original version of the
Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994).
Future Directions
The results of the current study provide researchers looking into NFC, the
Common Ingroup Identity Model, or both with some direction. One direction that should
be investigated is the impact of dispositional NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity
Model in the absence of a situational NFC manipulation. An evaluation of the three-way
interaction showed that the creation of time pressure caused scores on the dependent
variables to become essentially washed out. When participants in the Time Pressure
condition were excluded from the analysis, a significant interaction was found between
dispositional NFC and a common ingroup identity. Future research should eliminate the
time pressure manipulation and examine the effects of dispositional NFC on the Common
Ingroup Identity Model in order to see if the post-hoc results of the current study hold in
a dedicated experiment.
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Assuming that these post-hoc results are replicated, the adverse effect of evoking
a common ingroup identity on high-NFC individuals should be investigated in terms of
what is causing the adverse effect. One potential cause is that high NFC participants
viewed the common ingroup identity of “American” as having an unspoken racial
requisite and that, because he was violating this racial requisite, the athlete‟s identity as
an American was invalid (similar to the findings of Rutchick & Eccleston, 2010). A
second explanation could be that the tendency for high NFC individuals to seize and
freeze on an answer when they are given one (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) caused the
high NFC participants to seize and freeze on the first paragraph of the article, which
stated that the athlete had been stripped of his medal for doping.
Once the cause of the adverse effect is identified, future research could look into
methods of counteracting the effect. For example, if the term “American” has racial
implications, a different common ingroup should be used when dealing with outgroup
members of a racial minority. If the seizing and freezing explanation were found to be
true, then journalists attempting to write unbiased pieces could account for this effect by
beginning their articles with evidence for both sides of the story. Regardless of what
factor is truly causing the adverse effect of a common ingroup identity on high NFC
individuals, being able to account for it would improve the effectiveness of the CIIM.
Another direction that should continue to be explored is the link between NFC
and various prejudice reduction techniques. The need to find clarity and structure in the
environment and through interactions with others can be a powerful motivator
(Kruglanski et al., 1993), and, because of its links to prejudiced attitudes (De Zavala et
al., 1999), the NFC variable may help researchers explain why an individual would
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continue to fall back on stereotypes and prejudice, even after being given evidence that
goes against their beliefs. Investigating NFC in relation to prejudice reduction allows
researchers to account for this motivational need and tailor their techniques to be more
effective when dealing with individuals high in NFC.
The current study found limited support for NFC‟s impact on the effectiveness of
recategorization. However, previous research has found a stronger link between NFC and
intergroup contact (Dhont et al., 2011). Therefore, future research may want to
investigate NFC in relation to more contact-driven techniques, such as the Parasocial
Contact Hypothesis (Schiappa et al., 2005), the jigsaw classroom (Aronson, 2004), and
techniques involving the implementation of empathy (e.g., Stephan & Finlay, 1999).
Another direction that future research could follow pertains to the interaction
between situational and dispositional NFC. Previous research has largely ignored this
interaction, with researchers instead choosing to work with one or the other. While it may
not be necessary to account for both types of NFC when using the variable, it is at least
worth investigating the interaction between the two concepts. For example, future
research could test whether individuals high and low in dispositional NFC respond
similarly or differently when placed into a high-NFC situation. The results of the current
study suggest that there is no interaction between the two versions of NFC; however,
these results were concerned specifically with scores on the guilt and punishment
variables. An interaction between situational and dispositional NFC could easily exist
outside of the dependent variables that were measured in this study. Therefore, a
dedicated experiment into a NFC interaction would be worthwhile.
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Future research into the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio,
2000) may benefit from an exploration of other cognitive, motivational, and personality
variables with links to prejudiced attitudes. The model has shown problems in its
implementation when applied to real-world situations (e.g., Dach-Gruschow & Hong,
2006). One way that researchers can try to alleviate these problems is by attempting to
account for variables that would make an individual more or less likely to respond
positively towards the model. For example, if a teacher was able to identify certain
personality traits or motivational tendencies that caused a student to be less responsive to
the model, they could account for these variables when implementing the model to make
it more effective for that specific individual. Therefore, research into relevant individual
difference variables could help shape the Common Ingroup Identity Model into a
technique with more real-world applicability.
A fifth direction that future research can pursue is attitudes towards athletes who
have been accused of doping. There has been some previous research into the topic: one
study found that, in recent years, attitudes towards doping in sports have become less
rigid, with non-athletes adopting more tolerant opinions on the issue (Vangrunderbeek &
Tolleneer, 2010). However, the current study suggests that attitudes towards doping are
still quite negative. The mean for the Guilt Questionnaire was nearly five (out of seven)
across all conditions, and the average recommended punishment for the athlete was that
he be stripped of his medal. While these results do not indicate complete intolerance of
doping from all participants, they do suggest that most participants are unsympathetic to
the plight of athletes who have been accused of doping and that participants believe they
should be punished. Future research should investigate attitudes towards doping in a
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general population sample to see whether they have continued to decrease, stagnated, or
become more negative. Additionally, with the emergence of Lance Armstrong‟s doping
scandal in national news (Lindsey, 2012), it would be interesting to see if the fact that
these allegations are being brought against a national icon is enough to alter reactions
towards doping in general and, if so, whether this were a byproduct of recategorization.
Conclusions
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is a diverse
and useful tool for psychologists in their attempts to reduce prejudice and discrimination.
The model‟s reliance on recategorization, in which the individual is asked to think of
outgroup members instead as part of a superordinate ingroup, gives administrators
flexibility in their manipulation of the common ingroup identity, and the use of
superordinate identities allows for a multiplicity of choices when deciding upon a
common ingroup. The model‟s use of subtle, unobtrusive manipulations, like clothing
similarity (Dovidio et al., 1995) or the way in which an outgroup member is referred to
(e.g., Stone & Crisp, 2007), should also be attractive to administrators because
participants are not likely to exhibit the negative reactions that sometimes accompany the
more blatant prejudice reduction techniques (e.g., Legault et al., 2011).
The investigation of cognitive and personality variables in relation to the
Common Ingroup Identity Model allows the model to become even more relevant to real
world situations. For example, the cognitive evaluation of the terms “American” and
“White American” as being analogous to each other (Dach-Gruschow & Hong, 2006)
makes the use of the former as a common ingroup identity problematic. The ability of
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researchers to account for these variables allows for the creation of a more dynamic realworld technique for reducing prejudice.
The current study looked at the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s relationship
with NFC, one of these cognitive variables. Results suggest that NFC does not have a
direct effect on the model, but that a more complex relationship may exist, in which
levels of dispositional NFC causes inverse reactions to a common ingroup identity. These
results provide a foundation for further research into NFC‟s effects on the Common
Ingroup Identity Model. The results also extend research into NFC‟s ties to prejudice
reduction in general, suggesting that its impact may be limited to techniques that rely on
intergroup contact. While further research is necessary to fully understand NFC‟s effects
on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the current study provides a direction for future
research into the model‟s relationship with cognitive variables.
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APPENDIX A:
Need for Closure Scale
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement.
1 – strongly disagree
2 – somewhat disagree
3 – neutral
4 – somewhat agree
5 – strongly agree
1. I don‟t like situations that are uncertain.

_____

2. I don‟t like questions which could be answered in many different ways. _____
3. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.

_____

4. I feel uncomfortable when I don‟t understand the reason why an event occurred in my
life.
_____
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.
_____
6. I don‟t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
_____
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.

_____

8. When I am confronted with a problem, I‟m dying to reach a solution very quickly.
_____
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a
problem immediately.
_____
10. I don‟t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.

_____

11. I dislike it when a person‟s statement could mean many different things. _____
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. ____
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.

_____

14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own. ____
15. I dislike unpredictable situations.

_____
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Self-Esteem Scale
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement.
1 – strongly disagree
2 – somewhat disagree
3 – neutral
4 – somewhat agree
5 – strongly agree
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

_____

2. At times, I think I am no good at all.

_____

3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

_____

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.

_____

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

_____

6. I certainly feel useless at times.

_____

7. I feel that I‟m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

_____

8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

_____

9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

_____

10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.

_____
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APPENDIX C:
Conscientiousness Scale
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement.
1 – strongly disagree
2 – somewhat disagree
3 – neutral
4 – somewhat agree
5 – strongly agree
1. I am always prepared.

_____

2. I leave my belongings around.

_____

3. I pay attention to details.

_____

4. I get chores done right away.

_____

5. I like order.

_____

6. I make a mess of things.

_____

7. I follow a schedule.

_____

8. I often forget to put things back in their proper place.

_____

9. I am exacting in my work.

_____

10. I shirk my duties.

_____
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APPENDIX D:
Extraversion Scale
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement.
1 – strongly disagree
2 – somewhat disagree
3 – neutral
4 – somewhat agree
5 – strongly agree
1. I don‟t talk a lot.

_____

2. I feel comfortable around people.

_____

3. I keep in the background.

_____

4. I don‟t mind being the center of attention.

_____

5. I am the life of the party.

_____

6. I am quiet around strangers.

_____

7. I don‟t like to draw attention to myself.

_____

8. I start conversations.

_____

9. I talk to a lot of different people at parties.

_____

10. I have little to say.

_____
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The next few questions pertain to the doping case you have just read about in the news
article. While we understand that other information is necessary to assess the guilt of the
athlete, we would like you to answer a few questions about the athlete‟s guilt based on
the information you have been provided. Remember that your responses are anonymous,
and try to answer honestly.
Please circle the number corresponding to your choice.
1. The results of the tests conducted by the IOC are probably correct.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4
Not Sure

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

2. I believe Mendoza when he says that he is clueless as to the test results.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4
Not Sure

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

3. I believe that Mendoza is guilty of doping.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4
Not Sure

4. Mendoza should have been stripped of his medal.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4
Not Sure

5. Please indicate with a checkmark which punishment, if any, you believe the athlete
deserves. Select only one.
___ No punishment: I believe Mendoza should have retained his medal.
___ He should be fined, but should be allowed to keep his medal.
___ He should be stripped of his medal.
___ He should receive a substantial fine from the IAAF.
___ He should receive a two year ban from all international shot put competition.
___ He should be banned for life from the Olympics.
___ He should be banned for life from all international shot put competition.
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Big-Five Personality Test
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Please use this list of common human traits to describe yourself as accurately as possible.
Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the
future. Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other
persons you know of the same sex and of roughly your same age.
Before each trait, please write a number indicating how accurately that trait describes
you, using the following rating scale:
1 = extremely inaccurate
2 = very inaccurate
3 = quite inaccurate
4 = slightly inaccurate

5 = neither

Active
Agreeable
Anxious
Artistic
Assertive
Bashful
Bold
Bright
Careful
Careless
Cold
Complex
Conscientious
Considerate
Cooperative
Creative
Daring
Deep
Demanding
Disorganized
Distrustful
Efficient
Emotional
Energetic
Envious
Extraverted
Fearful
Fretful
Generous
Haphazard
Harsh
Helpful

6 = slightly accurate
7 = quite accurate
8 = very accurate
9 = extremely accurate
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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High-strung
Imaginative
Imperceptive
Imperturbable
Impractical
Inconsistent
Inefficient
Inhibited
Innovative
Insecure
Intellectual
Introspective
Introverted
Irritable
Jealous
Kind
Moody
Neat
Negligent
Nervous
Organized
Philosophical
Pleasant
Practical
Prompt
Quaint
Relaxed
Reserved
Rude
Self-pitying
Selfish
Shallow
Shy
Simple
Sloppy
Steady
Sympathetic
Systematic
Talkative
Temperamental
Thorough
Timid
Touchy
Trustful
Uncooperative

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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Uncreative
Unemotional
Unexcitable
Unimaginative
Unintelligent
Unkind
Unrestrained
Unsophisticated
Unsympathetic
Verbal
Vigorous
Warm
Withdrawn

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin
Title: Personality and the Olympics (Part One)
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study
looking at psychological measures in relation to the 2012 Olympics. In part one, you will
be asked to fill out four short personality surveys. Part one should take no longer than 15
minutes.
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice
and without penalty. Your responses are completely anonymous.
After completing part one of the study, you will be given a debriefing form
explaining the purpose of the surveys you have completed. You will be given a full
debriefing explaining the purpose of the entire study after completing part two. If you
still wish to participate in the study, we will now begin.
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Personality and the Olympics, Part One
Part one of this study was concerned with the levels people score on personality
measures. Specifically, in part one of this study, you completed the Need for Closure
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965),
and the Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test
(Goldberg, 1992). Need for closure refers to the motivational need for individuals to find
clarity, definition, and structure in their environments and their interactions with others.
Along with Conscientiousness and Extraversion, the other three factors in the Big-Five
are Openness to experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.
Thank you for participating in this study. Psychological research is not possible
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research related
to these questionnaires or would like to know your scores on the measures, feel free to
contact the researcher listed below.

Bradlee Gamblin
bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu
References
Goldberg, L.R. (1992). The development of markers for the Big-Five factor structure.
Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 26-42.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item
version of the Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
50(1), 90-94.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin
Title: Personality and the Olympics (Part Two)
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study
in which you will be asked to read an article about the 2012 Summer Olympics and give
your opinions on a few questions. This study should take no longer than 30 minutes.
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice
and without penalty; however, you will not be given credit for your participation. You
responses are completely anonymous.
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the
purpose of this study. If you still wish to participate in this study, we will begin.
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Just hours after the close of the Olympics, United States shot putter Claudio Mendoza
was stripped of his gold Monday in the first case of an athlete losing a medal for doping
at the 2012 London Games.
The International Olympic Committee said Mendoza, a former world champion, tested
positive for steroids both before and after winning the shot put last week for his first
Olympic gold.
"Catching cheats like this sends a message to all those who dope that we will catch
them," IOC spokesman Mark Adams said.
A hearing was held Sunday, a few hours before the closing ceremony, attended by three
United States team officials. They told the IOC that Mendoza had been tested in the
United States on July 25, July 26 and Aug. 1, and the results were negative. The athlete
arrived in London on Aug. 4 and went straight to the athlete village.
Mendoza told the American media that he had done nothing wrong.
"I do not understand where it could come from," he told BBC. "I'm looking like an idiot
to take this in heading for the Games and knowing that it is so easy to be tested.
Nonsense. I'm being tested every month, every week.
"I hope for the best. The most important thing for me is to clear my reputation. I've been
in the sport for so many years and have never faced any claims. And now at the major
event and after the gold medal? I do not understand it."
Track and field's governing body, the IAAF, will consider further action against
Mendoza, who could face larger consequences within the sport ranging from a multithousand dollar fine to a lifetime ban.

(Pictured: American shot putter Claudio Mendoza accepting his gold medal)

Figure 4. “Claudio Mendoza” (Athlete Used For Ingroup News Article).
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Just hours after the close of the Olympics, shot putter Claudio Mendoza was stripped of
his gold Monday in the first case of an athlete losing a medal for doping at the 2012
London Games.
The International Olympic Committee said Mendoza, a former world champion, tested
positive for steroids both before and after winning the shot put last week for his first
Olympic gold.
”Catching cheats like this sends a message to all those who dope that we will catch
them,” IOC spokesman Mark Adams said.
A hearing was held Sunday, a few hours before the closing ceremony, attended by three
team officials. They told the IOC that Mendoza had been tested on July 25, July 26 and
Aug. 1, and the results were negative. The athlete arrived in London on Aug. 4 and went
straight to the athlete village.
Mendoza told the media that he had done nothing wrong.
”I do not understand where it could come from,” he told BBC. “I‟m looking like an idiot
to take this in heading for the Games and knowing that it is so easy to be tested.
Nonsense. I‟m being tested every month, every week.
”I hope for the best. The most important thing for me is to clear my reputation. I‟ve been
in the sport for so many years and have never faced any claims. And now at the major
event and after the gold medal? I do not understand it.”
Track and field‟s governing body, the IAAF, will consider further action against
Mendoza, who could face larger consequences within the sport ranging from a multithousand dollar fine to a lifetime ban.

(Pictured: Shot putter Mendoza accepting his gold medal)

Figure 5. “Claudio Mendoza” (Athlete Used for Outgroup News Article).
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Summary Sheet
Please summarize the article that you have just read. Include as much detail as you can,
but do not re-write the article word for word. You will have five minutes to complete
your summary.
________________________________________________________________________
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Demographics Sheet
Please indicate your…
Race:
_____ Asian
_____ African-American
_____ Caucasian
_____ Hispanic
_____ Other (Please specify): _____________________________
Gender: ______________

Age: ______
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The Moderating Effects of Need for Closure on the Common Ingroup Identity
Model
This study was designed to test the relationship between need for closure, a
cognitive need to find quick, concrete answers (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and
the Common Ingroup Identity Model, a technique for reducing prejudice by inducing
members of different groups to think of themselves as one, all-inclusive group (Gaertner
& Dovidio, 2000). The present study is looking at the moderating effects of need for
closure on the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Previous research has shown that need
for closure moderates the effectiveness of intergroup contact, a separate prejudice
reduction technique (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011).
In this study, participants were randomly assigned to both an ingroup condition
and a closure condition. Participants read a news article describing a simulated drug
doping case from the 2012 Summer Olympics. Some participants were told that the
athlete was from the United States; others were given no country designation. Both
groups were then asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the guilt of the athlete in
question. Participants in the high need for closure condition were given time pressure by
being told they needed to finish the study in a hurry, while participants in the low need
for closure condition were not given this instruction. I predict that participants in the high
need for closure condition will be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity
Model than participants in the low need for closure condition. I also predict that this will
be moderated by dispositional need for closure, measured by the Need for Closure Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), which participants filled out online.
Thank you for participating in my study. Psychological research is not possible
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research on
reducing prejudice, feel free to contact me or consult the references listed below.
Bradlee Gamblin
bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu
References
Dhont, K., Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Opening closed minds: The combined
effects of intergroup contact and need for closure on prejudice. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(4), 514-528.
Gaertner, S.L., & Dovidio, J.F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The Common Ingroup
Identity Model. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Kruglanski, A.W., Webster, D.M., & Klem, A. (1993). Motivated resistance and
openness to persuasion in the presence or absence of prior information. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 65(5), 861-876.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011b). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item
version of the Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
50(1), 90-94.
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin
Title: College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University conducting a study for my
graduate thesis. In this study, you will complete four short personality surveys which will
be used in my thesis project. Your participation will take no longer than 30 minutes.
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice
and without penalty. Your responses are completely anonymous.
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the
purpose of the surveys you have completed. If you still wish to participate in this study,
we will now begin.
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College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities
This study was concerned with the levels people score on personality measures.
Specifically, you completed the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and the Conscientiousness and
Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992). Need for
closure refers to the motivational need for individuals to find clarity, definition, and
structure in their environments and their interactions with others. Along with
Conscientiousness and Extraversion, the other three factors in the Big-Five are Openness
to experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism.
Thank you for participating in this study. Psychological research is not possible
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research related
to these questionnaires or would like to know your scores on the measures, feel free to
contact the researcher listed below.
Bradlee Gamblin
bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu
References
Goldberg, L.R. (1992). The development of markers for the Big-Five factor structure.
Psychological Assessment, 4(1), 26-42.
Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Item selection and validation of a brief, 15-item
version of the Need for Closure Scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
50(1), 90-94.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin
Title: Psychology at the Olympic Games
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study
looking at psychology in relation to the 2012 London Olympics. In this study, you will be
asked to read an article about the 2012 Summer Olympics and give your opinions on a
few questions. This study should take no longer than 30 minutes.
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice
and without penalty. You responses are completely anonymous.
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the
purpose of the study. If you still wish to participate in the study, we will begin.
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The Moderating Effects of Need for Closure on the Common Ingroup Identity
Model
This study was designed to test the relationship between need for closure, a
cognitive need to find quick, concrete answers (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and
the Common Ingroup Identity Model, a technique for reducing prejudice by inducing
members of different groups to think of themselves as one, all-inclusive group (Gaertner
& Dovidio, 2000). The present study is looking at the moderating effects of need for
closure on the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Previous research has shown that need
for closure moderates the effectiveness of intergroup contact, a separate prejudice
reduction technique (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011).
In this study, participants were randomly assigned to both an ingroup condition
and a closure condition. Participants read a news article describing a simulated drug
doping case from the 2012 Summer Olympics. Some participants were told that the
athlete was from the United States; others were given no country designation. Both
groups were then asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the guilt of the athlete in
question. Participants in the high need for closure condition were given time pressure by
being told they needed to finish the study in a hurry, while participants in the low need
for closure condition were not given this instruction. I predict that participants in the high
need for closure condition will be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity
Model than participants in the low need for closure condition. I also predict that this will
be moderated by dispositional need for closure, measured by the Need for Closure Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), which participants filled out online at an earlier date.
Thank you for participating in my study. Psychological research is not possible
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research on
reducing prejudice, feel free to contact me or consult the references listed below.
Bradlee Gamblin
bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu
References
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